

## Message Text

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55

ACTION SS-25

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R 261610Z FEB 75

FM USMISSION GENEVA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 990

INFO AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PARIS

USMISSION NATO

US DEL MBFR 012

S E C R E T GENEVA 1313

EXDIS/NOFORN

DEPARTMENT PASS SECDEF

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PFOR, XG, PARM

SUBJECT: CSCE: CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES: SOVIET VIEWS ON  
NOTIFICATION OF MILITARY MANEUVERS AND MOVEMENTS

REF: STATE 34082

SUMMARY: US REP CONVEYED GUIDANCE IN REFTEL TO SOVIET  
REPS IN BILATERAL MEETING ON FEB 24. SOVIETS TOOK CARE-  
FUL NOTE OF US VIEWS ON MANEUVERS PARAMETERS, AND AMPLI-  
FIED THEIR RATIONALE FOR A MOVEMENTS TEXT WHICH WOULD  
PROVIDE FOR LATER RECONSIDERATION OF QUESTION IN LIGHT OF  
EXPERIENCE WITH MANEUVERS AND OBSERVERS MEASURES.  
SOVIET REPS EMPHASIZED THAT CSCE MOVEMENTS TEXT SHOULD  
NOT IN THEIR VIEW BE LINKED IN ANY WAY WITH FOLLOW-UP  
ISSUES. END SUMMARY.

1. DRAWING ON PARA 1 OF REFTEL, US REP INFORMED SOVIET  
MILITARY SECURITY REPS MICKHAILOV AND BASKAKOV ON FEB  
24 THAT A "POLITICAL" APPROACH TO ADVANCE NOTIFICATION

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OF MANEUVERS WAS NOT LIKELY TO BE SATISFACTORY TO

WESTERN AND NEUTRAL COUNTRIES. US REP STRESSED IMPORTANCE OF SOVIET ACCEPTANCE OF OBJECTIVE PARAMETERS FOR THE MANEUVERS TEXT, AND OF THE PRINCIPLE OF NOTIFICATION TO ALL CSCE PARTICIPANTS. SOVIETS TOOK CAREFUL NOTE AND INQUIRED AS TO MEANING OF WORD "OBJECTIVE", TO WHICH US REP REPLIED THAT THERE MUST BE SIMPLE, CLEAR CRITERIA FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF MANEUVERS THAT EVERYONE COULD UNDERSTAND AND THAT COULD NOT BE SUBJECT TO VARYING INTERPRETATIONS.

2. IN DISCUSSION OF MILITARY MOVEMENTS QUESTION, US REP DREW ON PARA 2 OF REFTEL TO INFORM SOVIETS THAT FORMULATIONS THEY HAD OFFERED IN PREVIOUS MEETING (GENEVA 855) WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE US AND NATO ALLIES BECAUSE OF THEIR FOLLOW-UP IMPLICATIONS, WHICH WERE INCONSISTENT WITH THE WELL-KNOWN WESTERN POSITION ON CSCE FOLLOW-UP.

3. SOVIET REPS DID NOT OFFER ANY NEW FORMULATIONS, BUT EXPLAINED IN MORE DETAIL THEIR RATIONALE FOR CONSIDERING A TEXT WHICH WOULD STATE THAT THE QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS COULD BE REOPENED OR RECONSIDERED IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE WITH THE MANEUVERS AND OBSERVERS MEASURES. GIVEN THAT CSCE PARTICIPANTS HAD BEEN COMMISSIONED IN THE HELSINKI BLUE BOOK TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIETS SAID IT WAS UNLIKELY THAT THERE COULD BE ANY CSCE CONSENSUS TO REPORT MERELY THAT THE IDEA HAD BEEN STUDIED. THE PROPOSED SOVIET TEXT WOULD GO ON TO INDICATE THAT AT SOME FUTURE TIME THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENTS COULD -- POSSIBLY -- BE REOPENED, NOT THAT THE STUDY COMMISSIONED AT HELSINKI WOULD BE CONTINUED OR RE-NEWED. THE SOVIET REPS EMPHASIZED THAT THEY DID NOT WISH TO PROJECT THEIR POSITION ON FOLLOW-UP OR ANYONE ELSE'S INTO THE TEXT ON MOVEMENTS. THE TEXT THE SOVIET UNION WAS SUGGESTING MADE NO REFERENCE TO WHEN OR HOW THE QUESTION MIGHT BE REOPENED. NOR DID IT CONCLUDE THAT THE QUESTION WOULD BE REOPENED, ONLY THAT IT MIGHT BE. IN FACT, ALL SORTS OF OUTCOMES WERE POSSIBLE. IF THE EXPERIENCE WITH MANEUVERS AND OBSERVERS MEASURES WERE UNSATISFACTORY, THE QUESTION OF MOVEMENTS WOULD PROB-

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ABLY NEVER BE REOPENED. EVEN IF THE EXPERIENCE WERE SUCCESSFUL, THIS STILL WOULD NOT NECESSARILY MEAN THAT THERE WOULD HAVE TO BE A DISCUSSION OF MOVEMENTS IN ANY FOLLOW-UP MEETING.

4. EXAMINING FOR THE PURPOSES OF ARGUMENT OTHER HYPOTHETICAL ALTERNATIVES FOR A SECOND SENTENCE FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE TEXT ON MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIETS OBSERVED THAT THE

CSCE COULD CONCLUDE THAT ANY MOVEMENTS MEASURE WAS PRE-MATURE. THIS WOULD BE PERFECTLY ACCEPTABLE TO THEM, BUT IT WOULD BE UNLIKELY TO "GET BY" WITH OTHER CSCE PARTICIPANTS. OTHERS WOULD ALMOST CERTAINLY INSIST ON AN ADDITIONAL STATEMENT TO THE EFFECT THAT MOVEMENTS WOULD NEED TO BE STUDIED FURTHER AT SOME FUTURE TIME, WHICH WOULD HAVE GREATER FOLLOW-UP IMPLICATIONS THAN WHAT THE USSR WAS NOW CONSIDERING. BASKAKOV SAID THE SOVIETS DO NOT WISH TO RULE OUT THE POSSIBILITY THAT A FOLLOW-UP PHASE OF THE CSCE MIGHT WISH TO TACKLE THE MOVEMENTS ISSUE, BUT, HE REPEATED ONCE AGAIN, THE SOVIETS DO NOT WISH TO LINK MOVEMENTS WITH FOLLOW-UP IN THE CBM TEXT. AS FOR THE POSSIBILITY OF A GENERAL STATEMENT ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENTS, THE SOVIETS SAID THEY BELIEVE THAT THIS SORT OF OUTCOME WOULD BE PARTICULARLY DANGEROUS, BECAUSE IT WOULD LEAVE ENTIRELY OPEN THE QUESTION OF WHERE, WHEN, AND HOW MILITARY MOVEMENTS MIGHT BE NOTIFIED, WHICH COULD LEAD TO DIFFERING AND DESTABILIZING INTERPRETATIONS.

5. US REP THANKED BASKAKOV AND MICKHAILOV FOR THIS INTERESTING ELABORATION OF THEIR VIEWS ON THE MOVEMENTS ISSUE, BUT TOLD THEM ONCE AGAIN THAT THE SUGGESTION THEY HAD PRESENTED AT OUR LAST MEETING AND EXPLAINED FURTHER AT THIS MEETING WOULD PRESENT FOLLOW-UP DIFFICULTIES FOR US. THEY ASKED WHAT THE US PREFERENCE WOULD BE FOR A MOVEMENTS OUTCOME. US REP REPLIED THAT CURRENT INSTRUCTIONS DID NOT COMPLETELY COVER WHAT THE US COULD ACCEPT, BUT WERE VERY CLEAR ON WHAT WE COULD NOT ACCEPT.  
DALE

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED SECDEF.  
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